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The potential disadvantage of undivided interests is that
IRS may take the position that, on later sale by individuals
receiving undivided interests through both the marital and
non-marital shares, it may not be possible to maintain the
different (usually higher) income tax basis for the interest
passing through the marital share with the result that a sale
of an undivided interest involves a proportionate part of
each basis amount.29  Thus, the basis amounts for the two
interests may merge after death.30
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
PLAN. The debtor's plan provided for satisfaction of a
secured claim by transferring a portion of the farm land
collateral to the creditor. The creditor objected to the plan as
not providing payment of the value of its claim. The court
valued the farm land on the basis of the land's development
potential because much of the land in the area was held for
investment. However, because only a portion of the
collateral land was being transferred the court required that
the plan provide for an "indubitable equivalent" of the
debtor's claim to be paid to the creditor. The court noted
that, because the valuation of the land was uncertain and any
sale would not be feasible for at least two years, any
valuation established by the court could lead to the creditor
receiving less than the value of the claim when the land was
sold. Although the court did not require any specific remedy
for approval of the plan, the discussion suggests that the
creditor receive a lien on any collateral retained by the
debtor until the land is sold so that the creditor can seek any
deficiency against the remaining collateral. In re Arnold &
Baker Farms, 85 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1996), aff’g, 177
B.R. 648 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ELIGIBILITY. Prior to filing for Chapter 12, the
debtors operated a hog farm. The debtors suffered losses in
their herd from disease which precipitated the bankruptcy
filing. Prior to filing a plan, the debtors turned over all
remaining livestock to the secured creditor. The plan
provided for full payment on an installment contract for the
purchase of the farm land. The land was owned by the
debtors and one debtor’s mother, who was not a co-debtor in
bankruptcy.  One effect of the plan payments was to pay the
mother’s share of the obligation on the farm without any
contribution from the mother. During the life of the plan, the
debtors’ primary income would be from nonfarm
employment and the debtors expressed the intent to use
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whatever extra income remained to rebuild the livestock
herd for the farm; however, this time the animals would be
sheep. The debtors did not provide any specific estimates
about the number of sheep to be purchased or the costs of or
income from raising the sheep. During the plan, the debtors
intended to lease some of the farm land for pasture and one
debtor planned to provide horse breaking services for a
neighbor. However, again, the debtors did not provide
specific details as to the amount of income reasonably
expected from these activities. The court held that the
debtors were not entitled to be Chapter 12 debtors and
dismissed the case for bad faith filing in that the plan
provided for payment of a nondebtor’s obligations, the
debtors had little chance to successfully reestablish farming
during the plan and the debtors had caused several delays in
prosecuting their case. In re Buckingham, 197 B.R. 97
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1996).
TRUSTEE FEES. The debtor’s Chapter 12 plan
provided for a trustee’s fee of 10 percent of the payments to
be made to the creditors. The trustee objected to the plan,
arguing that the fee was to be applied to the payments made
to the trustee, resulting in a 11.11 percent charge against the
payments to be made to the creditors. The court held that the
statutory fee of 10 percent was unambiguous and was
limited to 10 percent of the property to be paid to the
creditors. The court reasoned that, because the statute
assessed the fee against “the payments made under the plan”
and because only the trustee makes the plan payments, the
fee could not be assessed to payments made to the trustee by
the debtor. In re Wallace, 197 B.R. 82 (E.D. Mo. 1996),
aff’g, 167 B.R. 531 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994).
The debtor’s Chapter 12 plan provided for payment of
the only three creditors, two governmental units and the
FmHA (now FSA). The plan provided for direct payments
of the secured claims and payments of unsecured claims
from disposable income through the trustee. The trustee
objected to the direct payments. The court held that, because
the creditors were sophisticated creditors, the debtor could
make direct payments without payment of the trustee fee.
Matter of Cross, 197 B.R. 321 (D. Neb. 1996), aff’g, 182
B.R. 42 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
PLAN.  The debtors’ Chapter 13 estate included a
residence with $1,700 of nonexempt equity and personal
property with $5,199 of nonexempt equity. The Chapter 13
plan proposed to pay unsecured creditors $1,795. In
determining the amount creditors would receive in a
Chapter 7 liquidation, the costs of sale of the residence plus
the costs from capital gains from the sale of the residence
would leave nothing for payment to creditors from the
residence. If the residence was not sold by the hypothetical
Chapter 7 trustee, the sale of the personal property would
net $3,400 for unsecured creditors. The Chapter 13 trustee
argued that, in determining whether a Chapter 13 plan is fair
to creditors under Section 1325(a)(4), the second scenario
should be followed because a Chapter 7 trustee would not
administer an asset which would not bring any benefit to the
estate. The court agreed and held that the debtors’ Chapter
13 plan could not be confirmed because it did not provide
payments at least equal to the $3,400 that would be
available from the sale of the personal nonexempt assets. In
re Gayton, 197 B.R. 331 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ALLOCATION OF TAX PAYMENTS. The debtors
previously filed Chapter 7 case. The Chapter 7 trustee
obtained funds in settlement of a preferential transfer action
and applied the funds to payment of the debtors’ federal tax
claims. The trustee directed that the payments be made for
1982 taxes owed by the debtors, taxes which were
dischargeable in the present Chapter 13 case. The debtors
filed a motion in the Chapter 13 case to have the trustee’s
payments in the Chapter 7 case reallocated by the IRS to
nondischargeable taxes. The court held that debtors in
Chapter 7 are not entitled to allocate tax payments made in
the case; therefore, the payment could not be reallocated in
the Chapter 13 case. In re Ferguson, 197 B.R. 161 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1996).
DISMISSAL. In a prior Chapter 13 case, the debtor and
IRS entered into a consent agreement which established the
amount of the IRS claim and the amount of the secured
portion of the claim. That case was dismissed before any
distributions were made to the IRS. The debtors filed a
second Chapter 13 case and sought to limit the IRS claim to
the amount in the consent agreement in the first case. The
IRS sought to include additional penalties and interest
which accrued during the interim between filings. The court
held that the dismissal of the first case vacated the consent
agreement. United States v. Hampton, 197 B.R. 297 (E.D.
Ark. 1996).
CONTRACTS
GUARANTEE. The defendant originally was a partner
in a farming partnership with one other partner. The
partnership applied for an open line of credit with the
plaintiff but the plaintiff required both partners to personally
guarantee the obligations of the partnership. The guarantee
agreement required any revocation of the guarantee to be
made in writing. The defendant signed the agreement but
claimed to have not read it nor to have received a copy. The
partnership was eventually dissolved and the defendant sold
all interest in the concern to a corporation formed by the
other former partner. The defendant orally made a request to
an officer of the plaintiff to revoke the defendant’s
guarantee of the corporation’s obligations with the plaintiff.
At that time, no balance remained on the account. The
officer of the plaintiff informed the defendant a week later
that the guarantee was released. However, the corporation
later defaulted on the line of credit and the plaintiff sought
payment from the defendant under the guarantee. The
defendant argued that the plaintiff was estopped from
enforcing the guarantee. The court held that the doctrine of
estoppel was not available to the defendant because the
defendant had, or should have had, the same knowledge as
the plaintiff that any revocation of the guarantee was to be
in writing to be effective. In addition, the defendant did not
claim to have given any consideration for the revocation to
support an oral modification of the guarantee contract.
Farmland Industries, Inc. V. Bittner, 920 S.W.2d 581
(Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
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FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued interim
regulations which remove the restriction that precluded
eligibility for crop insurance for producers who produce
crops on predominately highly erodible land or on converted
wetlands. 61 Fed. Reg. 38057 (July 23, 1996).
FARM LOANS. The FSA has issued proposed
regulations which provide that a Notice of the Availability
of Loan Service and Debt Settlement Programs for
Delinquent Farm Borrowers will be sent after a borrower is
dismissed from bankruptcy if the borrower was not
previously notified and the account was not accelerated. 61
Fed. Reg. 37405 (July 18, 1996).
TOBACCO. The CCC has adopted as final the 1996
marketing quota for flue-cured tobacco at 873.6 million
pounds and a 1996 price support level of 106.1 cents per
pound. 61 Fed. Reg. 37672 (July 19, 1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GROSS ESTATE. The decedent had owned stock with
the decedent’s predeceased spouse as tenants by the entirety.
The stock was received when the corporation, owned in part
by the spouse, transferred the stock to the decedent’s spouse
and the decedent who took ownership with the decedent as
tenants by the entirety. In October 1986, the decedent and
spouse transferred $140,000 of stock to their two children
for life with remainders to their grandchildren. The decedent
and spouse elected to treat the gift as a split gift with each
claiming a gift of $70,000 less two $10,000 exclusions. The
spouse died within three years after the gift and the estate
included the taxable gift of $50,000 in the gross estate.
Under I.R.C. § 2001(e), if a joint gift was entirely includible
in the spouse’s estate under I.R.C. § 2035, then none of the
gift was included in the decedent’s estate. The court held
that the gift was not included in the spouse’s estate under
I.R.C. § 2035 but was included in the spouse’s estate under
I.R.C. § 2001(b) as a taxable gift. The estate argued that
because the decedent received the stock for no
consideration, the full amount of the gifted stock should
have been included in the spouse’s gross estate under I.R.C.
§ 2040. The court held that I.R.C. § 2040 did not apply
because the gifted stock was not owned by the spouse and
decedent at the time of the spouse’s death. The court
acknowledged that, under I.R.C. § 2035(a), property
transferred within three years of death is treated as owned
by the decedent; however, the court held that I.R.C. § 2035
did not apply because the stock was included in the spouse’s
estate by virtue of I.R.C. § 2001(b).  Estate of Greco v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-373.
INTEREST DEDUCTION. The decedent’s estate
included substantial stock holdings in a family owned
corporation. The decedent’s will provided for authority for
the executor to elect the 15-year installment payment of
estate tax. The stock was also subject to sale restrictions
which included provisions for repurchase of the decedent’s
stock in order to make the installment payments. However,
at the death of the decedent, the payment of estate taxes,
even with deferral by installment payment, would have
required the repurchase of a large number of shares at a time
when the corporation could not afford the repurchase. The
executor decided to borrow the funds for payment of the full
estate tax and incurred interest payments which the executor
claimed as a deduction on the estate’s initial and amended
returns. The IRS argued that the decedent’s will required the
election of installment payment of estate tax and disallowed
the interest deduction. The court held that under the
decedent’s will and state law, the executor had the
discretion to elect how to pay the estate tax, and because,
under the circumstances, the executor’s election to borrow
the funds was advantageous to the estate and the
corporation,  the interest deductions were allowed. Estate of
McKee v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-362.
RETURNS. After the death of the decedent, the
decedent’s heir was named executor. The heir had some
difficulty administering the estate and, upon the advice of
the estate’s attorney, filed for a 12 month extension to file
the estate tax return. The advice was incorrect because only
a six month extension was allowable; however, the IRS
approved a six month extension. The notice of the extension
was mailed to the heir. The heir had a disagreement with the
lawyer and obtained other legal counsel. The heir did not
file an estate tax return until seven months after the
extended due date for the return. The IRS assessed an
addition to tax for the untimely filed return. The heir argued
that the late penalty was excused because of the heir’s
reliance on the advice of the first attorney that a 12 month
extension was allowed. The court found that the heir had
notice of the six month extension at least several months
before the return was actually filed; therefore, the heir did
not reasonably rely on the incorrect advice. The heir also
argued that the late return was excused because of the
complexity of the estate administration. The court held that
the heir failed to show any excusable delay because the
statutes provide for filing of returns and payment of taxes
based on the information available, with amended returns
allowed when uncertain aspects of the estate are resolved.
Estate of Mehrafsar v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-351.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
STOCK REDEMPTION. The taxpayers each owned
one-half of the stock of a corporation. The taxpayer each
had been annually transferring stock to their children who
had been actively involved in the management of the
corporation for several years. The taxpayers sold some of
the remaining shares to the children for cash and had the
corporation redeem the remaining shares for a note at fair
market value. The note was for less than 15 years, the
payment of the note was not dependent upon corporate
profits, the taxpayers had no rights under the note or other
agreement to receive shares in the corporation in the event
of a default of the note, the taxpayer had no interests in the
corporation after the redemption and the taxpayers executed
an I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) agreement prohibiting the
reacquisition of any interest in the corporation for at least 10
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years. The IRS ruled that the redemption was not entered
into for the purpose of avoiding payment of taxes, the
redemption would be treated as a distribution in full
payment of stock, the taxpayers recognized gain based on
the difference between their adjusted basis in the stock and
the redemption price, the taxpayers could recognize gain on
the note on the installment method, no loss was
recognizable in the transaction, and the corporation did not
recognize any gain or loss on the transaction. Ltr. Rul.
9632008, May 10, 1996; Ltr. Rul. 9632009, May 10, 1996.
CASUALTY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayer
corporation operated several timberlands which were
infected with southern pine beetles. Although the beetles
were always present in the timberlands, in several tax years,
the beetles caused major damage to the taxpayer’s timber.
The court held that because an infestation of beetles can kill
a tree within days, the infestation at epidemic proportions
was a deductible casualty loss. The court held, however, that
the taxpayer was not entitled to any deduction because the
taxpayer’s records were insufficient to prove the amount of
loss.  The taxpayer also had several forests destroyed by
fires and one tract destroyed by the eruption of Mount St.
Helens. The court held that the fires and eruption were
casualty events allowing the taxpayer a deduction for the
loss of trees. The appellate court affirmed on these issues.
The taxpayer had used the depletion block method of
determining the loss from the casualties. The IRS argued
that the  “tree stand” method should have been used. The
trial court had overruled precedent and ruled that the tree
stand method should have been used. The appellate court
reversed on this issue, holding that the precedent should
have been followed, allowing the depletion block method
for determining the amount of loss. The taxpayer began
salvage logging of the affected areas and recognized gain
from the income from these activities. The IRS had allowed
the taxpayer to recognize these gains under I.R.C. § 1033.
The trial court held that the taxpayer was not required to
offset these gains against the losses. The appellate court
affirmed this holding because the salvage operation were
considered separate activities from the casualties.
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S., 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,420 (Fed. Cir. 1996), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 32
Fed. Cl. 80 (1994).
CONSERVATION EASEMENT. The taxpayers
owned ranch land which included developed and
undeveloped land. The taxpayers transferred a conservation
easement to a charitable organization for the purpose of
maintaining the natural, scenic and open space conditions of
the land. The land had been determined to have important
wildlife preservation qualities. The easement, in general,
prohibited the further development of the area which
adversely impacted the scenic views, the agricultural use
and the wildlife on the land. The easement gave the
organization the authority to prohibit the taxpayers from
further development of the land which adversely impacted
the goals of the easement, although the taxpayers were
allowed to build a second residence on the land and to add
additional improvements to the existing homestead ranch.
The subsurface mining rights were retained in part by
previous owners but the taxpayers presented evidence by
mineral experts that no significant amounts of minerals
existed under the surface. The taxpayers retained rights to
the surface mining but the easement granted the
organization the right to prohibit such mining if it adversely
impacted the goals of the easement. The IRS ruled that the
transfer of the easement qualified for the charitable
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9632003, May 7, 1996.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].*  The taxpayer
corporation made improvements to its buildings used in its
restaurant business and claimed depreciation under the
Asset Depreciation Range for buildings placed in service
before January 1, 1981 and ACRS for improvements to
buildings placed in service after December 31, 1980. The
taxpayer argued that the improvements were included in the
ADR Class 57.0 as improvements that were part of the
structural shell of the buildings. The Tax Court held that
I.R.C. § 1250 property was not included in the ADR Class
57.0 by statute unless the IRS explicitly includes the
property in the class. Because the IRS has not included the
property in the class, the improvements had to be
depreciated using the 15-year recovery period for real
property. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
property classified under Class 65.0 could be depreciated
based on a 10-year useful life. On remand, the Tax Court
noted that the parties agreed that assets which could be
included under both categories would be classified as Class
57.0 property. The Tax Court held that items such as interior
partitions, ceiling systems, electrical lighting, and floor
finishes could fit under both categories; therefore, these
items were Class 57.0. Other items, such as decor finishes
and decorative canopies were only included as Class 65.0
property because these items were more closely related to
the operation of a restaurant and not to the building
structure. Walgreen Co. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-
374, on rem. from, 68 F.3d 1006 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'g,
103 T.C. 582 (1994).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was a
doctor who operated a horse farm. The court held that losses
incurred by the horse farm activity were not allowed
because the farm was not operated for profit where the farm
had suffered substantial continuing losses without much
chance of future profits. The appellate decision is designated
as not for publication. Borsody v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-534, aff’d, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,415 (4th
Cir. 1996).
LOSSES. The taxpayer’s employment was terminated
and the taxpayer sued the employer for wrongful
termination, seeking $200,000 in damages for lost wages.
The parties settled for $27,000. The taxpayer claimed the
difference as a loss. The court held that the mere expectation
of payment was insufficient to support the deduction. Kukes
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-363.
PENSION PLANS. The taxpayer suffered a downturn
in business and had to make premature withdrawals from
SEP and Keogh plans to pay debts. The taxpayer included
the payments in gross income but did not pay the 10 percent
additional tax of I.R.C. § 72(t). The taxpayer argued that,
although not provided in the statute, there should be an
exception to the additional tax for withdrawals necessitated
by financial hardship. The Tax Court refused to recognize
any exception not specifically provided in the statute and
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held that the taxpayer was liable for the 10 percent
additional tax. Pulliam v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-354.
The taxpayer owned an interest in a qualified retirement
plan through the taxpayer’s employer. The taxpayer was 36
when the taxpayer withdrew $50,000 from the plan and used
the funds to purchase a family residence. The court held that
the use of the funds to purchase a home was not a transfer to
an eligible retirement plan and caused the funds to be
included in the taxpayer’s gross income, plus a 10 percent
penalty for early withdrawal. Coffield v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-365.
PREPRODUCTION EXPENSES. In 1985, the
taxpayer purchased a corporation which owned farm land
and intended to use the land for the production of
ornamental trees. In 1985, the taxpayers cleared the land,
bought seedlings and planted the trees. In 1986, the
taxpayers’ expenses were substantially preproductive
expenses for the maintenance of the trees. The court
acknowledged that for 1985 and 1986, the taxpayers had the
election to deduct or capitalize these expenses. The
taxpayers incurred similar expenses in 1987 through 1990
because the trees were still not ready for sale, although the
trees should have been ready within three years of planting.
The taxpayers claimed the 1985-1990 expenses as business
deductions and the court held that this constituted an
election by the taxpayers not to capitalize the expenses. The
taxpayers sought to file amended returns for 1987-1990 to
revoke the election. The court held that the taxpayers could
not revoke the election without the consent of the IRS.
Hodel v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-348.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer had been
married to and lived with a former spouse at one residence.
The couple were divorced and as part of the divorce
settlement, the former spouse was allowed to live at the
marital residence with the provision that when the residence
was sold, each would receive one-half of the proceeds. The
taxpayer went to live with another person and eventually
married that person. The former residence was sold with the
taxpayer recognizing gain from the taxpayer’s one-half of
the proceeds. The taxpayer did not include the gain in
income because of I.R.C. § 1034 deferral of gain from the
sale of a residence. The taxpayer and new spouse then sold
the second residence and purchased a new residence, again
deferring gain under I.R.C. § 1034. The court held that the
sale of the first residence was not eligible for deferral of
gain because it was not the taxpayer’s principal residence at
the time of the sale. The court noted the inconsistency of the
taxpayer’s deferrals in that the second residence could not
be the taxpayer’s principal residence at the same time as the
first residence was the taxpayer’s principal residence. Perry
v. Comm’r, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,405 (9th Cir.
1996).
TAX LIENS. A corporation owed federal taxes and
owed the taxpayer amounts from a judgment rendered
against the corporation. The IRS filed a Notice of Levy on
September 1, 1994 and filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien
(NFTL) against amounts owed to the corporation by a third
party. The taxpayer had obtained a state court writ of
garnishment against the third party on October 14, 1994.
The issue was whether the federal tax lien was effective as
of the Notice of Levy or when the NFTL was filed. The
court acknowledged some split in authority on the issue but
followed the more recent precedents and held that the lien
became effective only after the NFTL was filed. Sandclay
Trucking, Inc., 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,394 (M.D.
Fla. 1996).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
EMBLEMENTS. The plaintiff purchased farm land
from an estate. The decedent had leased the land to the
defendant who grew Christmas trees on the property. The
lease allowed termination by the decedent or successors in
interest by at least 30 days’ notice prior to January 30 of
each year. During the sale negotiations, the plaintiffs
expressed concern about the lease and the defendant was
approached for a release of the lease. The defendant signed
a quitclaim deed releasing all rights in the real property. The
sale was completed but the defendant continued to care for
the trees on the property and removed 190 of them several
months after the sale. The plaintiffs sued for timber trespass.
The defendant argued that the doctrine of emblements
allowed the removal of the trees because the lease was for
an uncertain period and the trees were planted by the
defendant before the termination of the lease. The defendant
also claimed that the quitclaim deed was not voluntarily
entered into because the defendant had defaulted on rent
payments and was under the threat of termination of the
lease. The court held that the defendant voluntarily executed
the quitclaim deed because the default resulted from the
defendant’s own actions. The court also held that the
quitclaim deed also released the defendant’s emblements
rights because the defendant’s rights in the trees passed
under the deed as part of the realty. Taggart v. Battablia,
915 P.2d 1001 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
TERMINATION NOTICE. In March 1994, the
plaintiffs purchased farmland which was leased to the
defendants by the sellers. (See case summary of issue of
validity of the lease under Trusts, infra.) In May of 1994,
the plaintiffs sent a notice of the termination of the lease,
effective June 1, 1994, and demanded possession of the land
by that date. The lease was found to be a year-to-year lease
because the plaintiffs did accept some rent payments and
was found to run with the calendar year. The defendants
continued to retain possession until after the 1995 crop was
planted and the defendant also sought rights to the planted
crop. The defendants argued that the notice was ineffective
to terminate the lease, under Mo. Stat. § 441.050, because
the notice was not given 60 days before the end of the year.
The court held that the statute required notice “not less than
60 days” prior to the end of the lease year; therefore, a
notice of termination given seven months before the end of
the year was effective to terminate the lease at the end of the
year. The trial court had awarded the 1995 crop to the
defendants with the right to harvest the crop and sell it,
subject to payment of one-third to the plaintiffs less the
costs of harvest. The appellate court remanded on this issue
because the trial court failed to give any authority or
findings of facts to support this ruling and because the
holding summarized here reversed the trial court on the
termination issue. Jansen v. Pobst, 922 S.W.2d 43 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996).
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NEGLIGENCE
SAFE WORKPLACE. The plaintiff was an employee
of the defendant which operated a dairy farm. The plaintiff
was injured while attempting to remove frozen feed from a
conveyer in the milking barn. The plaintiff testified as to the
dangers of working in the barn in cold weather when the
high humidity in the barn and the cold winter air would
often produce slippery conditions in all parts of the barn.
However, the plaintiff had prepared testimony from experts
that the method chosen by the plaintiff to clear the conveyer
was the only reasonable method available. The plaintiff
charged that the lack of alternative methods created an
unsafe workplace. The defendant argued that the plaintiff
realized and assumed the risk of using the method to clean
the conveyer. The trial court had granted the defendant a
summary judgment, but the appellate court reversed,
holding that the plaintiff’s intended expert testimony was
sufficient to raise a jury question as to whether the plaintiff
had a choice in method of cleaning the conveyer. Mack v.
Kranz Farms, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 812 (S.D. 1996).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
TRACTOR. The plaintiff’s decedent was killed when
the decedent’s tractor turned over while the decedent was
operating it in a farm field. The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer of the tractor in strict liability, claiming that
the tractor was unreasonably dangerous because it did not
have a Roll Over Protection System (ROPS ) installed. The
defendant argued that the tractor was not dangerous because
the lack of a ROPS was an obvious condition of the tractor.
The court held that the open and obvious defense did not
apply in Missouri because of the availability of the
comparative fault rule. Because the jury award included a
finding that the plaintiff’s decedent was 10 percent at fault,
the jury award accounted for the decedent’s assumption of
risk in operating the tractor without a ROPS. Miller v.
Varity Corp., 922 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
AERIAL CROP SPRAYING. The appellant was fined
$1,500 under Tex. Agric. Code § 76.116(a)(1) for the aerial
spraying of a pesticide on an automobile on a public
highway near cotton fields the appellant was spraying. The
appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove
that the appellant sprayed the field on the day claimed. The
evidence presented was the testimony of the occupants of
the car and state inspectors who inspected the car and the
field the day after the alleged spraying. The appellant’s
major argument was that the description of the plane by the
car occupants was incorrect. However, the occupants’
description of the plane’s colors was close, although not
completely accurate, and the inspectors’ tests on the
pesticide residue were consistent with the break down of the
pesticide over one day. The court held that the fine was
supported by substantial evidence. Lauderdale v. Texas
Dept. Of Agric., 923 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
APPLES. The plaintiffs were apple growers who had
contracted with the defendant commission merchant to
process, package, market and sell the plaintiffs’ apples on
consignment. The contracts authorized the defendant to sell
the apples to affiliated companies and to commingle the
apples with other growers’ apples. The defendant sold some
of the apples, commingled with other apples, to affiliated
companies and the plaintiffs charged that these sales
violated Wash. Rev. Code § 20.01.330(4) in that the
defendant failed to give notice of the sales to affiliates. The
defendant argued that the statute was not violated because
the contracts allowed the sales of apples to affiliates. The
court held that the contractual authority to make the sales
was not equivalent to notice to the growers and held that the
sales violated the statute. The defendant also argued that,
because the apples were commingled as allowed by the
contract, notice was not possible since the identity of the
producer was lost. The court held that the statute provided
no exception from the notice requirement for difficulty in
making the notice. The jury had awarded the plaintiffs
$38,000 in damages, representing the gross profits of the
defendant from the affiliate sales. The court found that the
defendant had not breached any fiduciary duties in the sales
because the sales were authorized by the contracts, the
defendant fully reported the sales to the plaintiffs and
exercised prudent business judgment in making the sales.
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs’ recovery would
be limited to the net profits gained by the affiliates from the
sales. St. Hilare v. Food Services of America, 917 P.2d
1114 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
TRUSTS
APPARENT AUTHORITY. The decedent had owned
farm land with a predeceased spouse for several years and
continued to own the land alone for several years but rented
the land to the defendants. The decedent transferred the
farm to a trust for the decedent’s children with the decedent
retaining a life estate in the trust income. Although the lease
payments were to be made to the trustees, the children, the
decedent continued to personally collect the rent. The
testimony of the trustees was that both trustees informed the
defendants that the decedent no longer had the authority to
sign contracts concerning the land. However, the defendants
entered into two more long term leases with the decedent.
After the decedent died, the land was sold to the plaintiff
who informed the defendants that the lease was terminated
and that the defendants should vacate the property in 60
days. (See summary of the issue of the termination of the
lease under Landlord and Tenant, supra.) The plaintiffs
argued that the lease was invalid in that the decedent had no
authority to make the lease. The defendants argued that the
trustees had ratified the lease by not objecting to it or by the
practice of payment of the rent to the decedent. The court
upheld the jury verdict that the lease was invalid, holding
that there was sufficient evidence that the decedent did not
have apparent authority to make the lease or that the
defendants reasonably relied on the decedent’s conduct,
since the defendants had notice of the trust. Jansen v.
Pobst, 922 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
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ZONING
EXCEPTIONS . The petitioner owned farm land
neighboring the respondents. The respondent had petitioned
the county land use board (LUBA) for construction of a
second residence on the respondent’s land. The
respondent’s land had been zoned agricultural but had been
rezoned for residential use which allowed the construction
of only one residence on the property. Under Policy 8 of the
county’s comprehensive zoning plan, protection of
agricultural activities was to be of primary importance in
zoning matters. The hearing officer and, on appeal, LUBA
determined that Policy 8 did not apply because the
respondent’s land was not used or zoned for agricultural
activities. The court held that the hearing officer should
have applied Policy 8 because the zoning change would
impact neighboring farm land. Gutoski v. Lane County,
917 P.2d 1048 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
CITATION UPDATES
Estate of Shelfer v. Comm’r, 86 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir.
1996) (marital deduction) see p. 113 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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